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I.

INVALIDITY OF THE TRANSFER AND LAW GOVERNING RESTITUTION OF
THE STATE'S INTEREST IN THE DISPUTED STATE SCHOOL SECTION
GARFIELD COUNTY'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONS FOR REHEARING dated

19 October 1993 ["County Response11] purports to address the
question of remedy for the violation of law adjudicated in this
matter.

That violation of law involved a breach of trust by the

Division of State Lands and Forestry in executing a deed to
transfer school trust land to complete a land exchange in which
the values of the exchanged lands were based on an unlawful
appraisal recruited by the exchange proponent.

This Court held

that the fundamental trust obligation to ensure receipt of full
value for school trust lands required, as a matter of law, that
the values for the exchange be established by an independent
appraisal obtained by the Division as trustee instead of by the
proponent of the exchange.
The specific remaining question posed on rehearing, with
respect to this aspect of the case, is whether the adjudicated
violation of law and breach of trust should properly result in
invalidation of the transfer of the trust property, affirming the
state's continuing right and interest in the land.
Petitioner has argued that the remedy in this case should be
the usual remedy for unlawful action by an administrative agency
—

invalidation of the unlawful action and remand to the agency

for reconsideration in light of the agency's legal obligations
and the Court's determinations.

Petitioner has also pointed out
1

that a remedy invalidating the transfer is essential in order for
the Division to fulfill its trust obligations (as defined by this
Court) by taking advantage of the new opportunity for advantageous state-federal land exchanges offered by recent federal
legislation.
The County Response, however, purports to argue that
remedies derived from traditional concepts of trust
administration call for a different disposition here.

Thus, the

Response claims that traditional remedies for breach of trust do
not provide for invalidation of the transfer or similar remedy
affirming the trust's continuing interest in the land.1
The County is grossly in error in its assertions that
established remedies for breach of trust do not provide* for
protection of the trust interest in the disputed land.

Indeed,

none of the cases or authorities cited by the County in any way
address or deal with the appropriateness of reversing deed
transactions in order to restore property transferred in breach
None of the cases or authorities cited by the County in
any way address or deal with the issue in question. Instead, the
County Response at 3-4 relies solely on cases that adjudicate
whether certain transactions by a trustee resulted in a breach.
The County's assertion that the remedy in those cases depended on
whether the price was inadequate, Id. at 4-5, 10-11, is both true
and irrelevant. In the cited cases, the adequacy of value received
was a central issue in determining whether the trustee's conducted
constituted a breach of trust. Here, the Court has adjudicated
existence of the breach of trust based on its sound interpretation
of the trustee's duty to follow valuation practices that will
minimize speculation about values. The question here at issue
concerns the proper remedy for that adjudicated breach. Moreover,
the County's assertion that in the cited cases "the sales in
question were not voided" is also equally irrelevant for the simple
reason that the cases involved actions in which only a damage
remedy was sought.
2

of trust.

Instead, the cases asserted as the basis for the

County Response (particularly at 3-5, 10-11) address a much
different question: whether a breach of trust resulted from
certain transactions by a trustee.
—

For that purpose, it is true

but irrelevant to the instant case —

that the cited cases

turned on the adequacy of trustee judgments about the adequacy of
value received.2
Here, the Court has already determined that there was a
breach of trust based on the trustee's duty to obtain an
independent appraisal in order to ensure reliability of
transaction values.

The remaining question at issue concerns the

proper remedy for that adjudicated breach.
Contrary to the County's contentions, fundamental concepts
of trust law clearly hold that a transferee who receives a
transfer of land or other trust property in breach of trust holds
the property subject to the interest of the trust and is subject
to appropriate orders for restitution.

The relevant legal

questions do not turn on the propriety of a remedy against the
property (except in circumstances, irrelevant here, involving
bona fide purchasers in a subsequent transaction).

The key

questions, instead, concern the circumstances in which the
transferee is properly held to have such notice of the trust
obligations and/or involvement in the breach of trust as to

The County's assertion that "the sales in question were not
voided" in the cited cases is also irrelevant for the simple reason
that the cited cases involved actions in which only a monetary
remedy was sought.
3

justify the application of that otherwise clearly-available
remedy.
First, concerning the propriety of the remedy for recovery
of the trust property, the Restatement of the Law, Trusts 2d3 is
explicit, both in its direct treatment of the issue and in its
development of refinements which depend upon attribution of
notice to the transferee.

Analysis begins with the proposition

that where notice of the elements constituting the breach is
attributed to the transferee, "the transferee does not hold the
property free of the trust, although he paid value for the
transfer."

Restatement Trusts 2d at § 288, specifically

explaining further that "the interest of the beneficiary in the
trust property is not cut off" in these circumstances, and "the
beneficiary can in equity compel the third person to restore the
property to the trust."

Id. at "Comment a."

Moreover, the above general principles are made "blackletter" explicit with regard to a specific right to remedies
against the property:
§ 291. Extent of Liability of Transferee with Notice
(1) Where the trustee in breach of trust transfers
trust property to a person who takes with notice of the
breach of trust, the transferee can be compelled,
(a) if he has not disposed of the property, to restore
it to the trust, together with the income which he has
received from the property; . . . .

3

These concepts and basic text of Restatement Trusts 2d
published by the American Law Institute 1959 are maintained and
remain unqualified in the subsequent Appendix volume for the period
1959-1986 and current supplement.
4

Restatement Trusts 2d at § 291 (emphasis added).
Second, then, the key question is whether, given the
circumstances of the breach of trust at issue here, "notice" of
that breach of trust can properly be attributed to the
transferee.

Obviously, there is no credible basis on which the

County could claim lack of notice of the rigorous trust
obligations under which the land in question was held.

Hence,

the only question here is whether notice of the elements
constituting the breach of trust is legally attributable to the
transferee County.
As discussed infra, the facts about the County's actual
notice of questions about the validity of the appraisals in this
case are in themselves sufficient to attribute notice of the
breach of trust, and certainly to place on the County a duty of
inquiry.

But any question about the propriety of that

attribution is resolved by the established law summarized in the
Restatement and its explanatory comments.
First, given the determination that the instant transaction
was unlawful, it is doubtful under the law summarized by the
Restatement that even complete lack of actual notice would be a
defense:
§ 290. Transferee in an Illegal Transaction
If the trustee in breach of trust and as part of an
illegal transaction transfers trust property to a person who
knows the circumstances which make the transaction illegal,
the transferee does not hold the property free of the trust,
although he had no notice of the trust.

5

* * *

[Comment] (b) Mistake of law or fact. The rule stated in
this Section is applicable if the transferee knows the
circumstances which make the transaction illegal, even
though he does not know that as a matter of law it is
illegal. The rule is not applicable, however, unless the
transferee knows the circumstances which make the
transaction illegal.
Restatement Trusts 2d at § 290 and Comment (b). Here, of course,
there is no question that the County was well aware of all the
circumstances which this Court found to render the transaction
unlawful because of failure to obtain a proper appraisal.

The

traditional application of the above trust concepts is to
transactions traditionally void as a matter of public policy
(e.g., gambling).

See Comment (a). But the strong public

policy, statutory and constitutional obligations recited by this
Court as the basis for the trust obligation in this case
justifies an equally strong presumption that the transferee must
make restitution of the property to the trust.4
Even if attribution of notice of the breach of trust should
be considered necessary in these circumstances, both the
Restatement and the facts of the case demonstrate satisfaction of
that requirement, again requiring restitution of the property:
§ 297. What Constitutes Notice of Breach of Trust
A person has notice of a breach of trust if

4

With respect to remedies, § 290 cross references § 293,
which in turn invokes § 292. That section of the Restatement is
explicit: "If he [the transferee] has not disposed of the property
but still retains it, the beneficiary can charge him as constructive trustee of the property and can compel him to restore it to
the trust . . . ." Restatement Trusts 2d at § 292, Comment a.
6

(a)

he knows or should know of the breach of trust, or

(b) by statute or otherwise he is subjected to the
same liabilities as though he knew or should have known of
the breach of trust, even though in fact he did not know and
had no reason to know of the breach of trust.
*

*

*

[Comment] (j) Notice of Legal effect of terms of trust.
When a transferee knows or should know the terms of the
trust, he is chargeable with notice of the legal effect of
those terms. Thus, if under the terms of the trust the
trustee is not empowered to sell the trust property, the
transferee is chargeable with notice of the lack of power of
the trustee, even though the transferee was not unreasonable
in interpreting the trust instrument as conferring a power
of sale upon the trustee, and even though the transferee so
interpreted the instrument as the result of advice of
competent counsel.
Restatement Trusts 2d at § 297 and explanatory Comment (j). The
cases cited in support of the above analysis in Restatement
Trusts 2d Appendix volume at § 297 involve a wide range of
settings in which the circumstances gave rise to a legal
obligation on the part of the transferee to inquire into the
legal basis for the trusteed actions and to correctly assess
their lawfulness.

Error in those assessments charged the

transferee with notice of the breach of trust and accompanying
obligations of restitution.
Under the circumstances of this case, there can be no doubt
of the County's recognition of the rigorous trust obligations
governing the actions of the trustee Division of State Lands and
Forestry.

Here the County itself was not only aware of the trust

obligations, but knew that those obligations were specifically
applicable to the instant transaction and involved substantial
duties to seek full value in disposal of trust property.
7

See

"Board Memo" dated July 27, 1987, at page three, transmitted to
Garfield County as enclosure to letter dated August 7, 1987, from
Patrick D. Spurgin, Director, Division of State Lands & Forestry
to Tom Hatch, Chairman, Garfield County Commission.

Also summar-

ized in Board meeting attended by Chairman Hatch as reflected in
Minutes of Meeting of Utah Board of State Lands and Forestry
dated September 11, 1987, at page 21. See Record items 5 and 9
as listed in letter transmitting administrative record to the
Court dated March 3, 1988.

Both of the above summaries known to

the County Commission expressly recited the Board's "fiduciary
duty," specifying that it includes "a duty to seek full value in
the disposal of trust property" and "a duty of loyalty, i.e., the
Board must strive to benefit the trust beneficiaries and may not
have, as it's [sic] purpose, the benefit of a third party .. . ."
The County's actual notice as well as duty of inquiry was
unquestionably clear after the Division not only advised the
County of its concerns about the adequacy of the appraisal
submitted, but also notified the County that issues raised by
Petitioner NPCA specifically related to the adequacy of the
appraisal.
First, by letter to the Division of October 14, 1987, NPCA
had filed its requests for "declaratory rulings" which raised
specific questions about the propriety of appraisals "recruited"
by the exchange proponent (and were on the public record). See
Record item 15 as listed in letter transmitting administrative
record to the Court dated March 3, 1988. NPCA's request
8

specifically invoked statutory requirements of UCA § 65-1-26
which required appraisal by a "suitable person," and questioned
"whether it is ever appropriate for the "suitable person" who
conducts the Division's appraisal to be hired by an interested
party . . . ."

Id. at 5.

Second, the Division subsequently advised the County that it
had specific concerns about the adequacy of the appraisal
supplied by the County's appraiser and, without correction of the
appraisal, simply proposed that the County proffer additional
lands to increase the values considered in the exchange.

Letter

to Tom Hatch, Chairman, Garfield County Commission, from Patrick
D. Spurgin, Director of the Division dated November 3, 1987. See
Record item 16 listed in letter transmitting administrative
record to the Court dated March 3, 1988. The same letter advised
the County of NPCA's requests for declaratory rulings that raised
the above questions, specifically advising the County that the
letter raised "issues concerning the propriety of undertaking the
exchange indicated in Garfield County's original application and
as modified in accordance with the requirements of this letter"
(i.e., requiring additional exchange value).

Thus, it was

abundantly clear that the County was put on inquiry concerning
the adequacy of the appraisal, of the value problems in the
transaction, and of the availability in the record of NPCA
specific legal questions concerning the propriety of a proponent"recruited" appraisal.
Thus, both the established law of trust remedies and the
9

facts of this case make clear that the transferee County was
properly "chargeable with notice of the legal effect" of the
requirements of the trust.

Indeed, that would be so "even though

the transferee was not unreasonable" in assessing the obligations
governing the transfer, and even if interpretation of the trust
requirements was "the result of advice of competent counsel".
Trusts 2d § 297, comment j, supra.
Here, the Court has made clear that the strict trust
obligations protecting school trust lands —

well known to the

County in the course of the challenged transaction —

required

the assurance of an independent appraisal answerable only to the
trustee, not arranged by the purchaser.

The County was not in

doubt about the extent and rigor of the school trust obligation.
Indeed, the County argued that obligation as the basis for its
claim in this litigation that the duty to complete the
transaction overrode other obligations.

Hence, the County's

knowledge that the trustee had failed to comply with the legal
obligation to obtain an independent appraisal, and its
participation in arranging and promoting reliance on the unlawful
appraisal, are more than sufficient to charge the County with
notice of the breach of trust.

Any doubt about that legal

conclusion is fully allayed by the facts outlined above, which
clearly placed the County on inquiry.
II.

ISSUES CONCERNING THE DIVISIONS OBLIGATION TO CONSIDER
NON-ECONOMIC VALUES
The County asserts that "it is clear that this Court

understood the considerations posed by NPCA in the appeal."
10

County Response at 13•

It then asserts that the issue ruled on

concerned "an affirmative duty" to "look for "non-economic"
options as a priority . . . "

County Response at 13. Any

implication that Petitioner NPCA sought priority of non-economicvalues over trust obligations flies in the face of the extensive
demonstration at original briefing and in the Petition for
Rehearing that that was not NPCA's position.

NPCA Petition for

Rehearing at 12-15.
One further demonstration that the Court may not have
"understood the considerations posed by NPCA" is indicated in the
Court's footnote 12, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, at 29f 30 n. 12. The
Court there addressed NPCA's contention that the Division had
failed to give any substantive consideration to protective
management of the disputed state section, disregarding any
obligation to consider applicable standards arising from the
federal legislation protecting national parks.

Brief for

Petitioner at 34, 35-37; Reply Brief for Petitioner at 17-20.
The Court's footnote suggests that the cited cases do not
establish the cited proposition —

i.e., "that federal

legislation protecting national parks extends beyond federal
boundaries to state inholdings."
In asserting that those cases are "distinguishable," the
footnote, in fact, suggests that the Court may not have
understood both the argument and the cases cited.

The argument

is misunderstood because it asserted only that the federal

11

statutes and their interpretation give rise to a duty of
consideration of the park values, and that the Division at least
bore a duty to consider their protection, which was ignored by
the Division.

Brief for Petitioner at 34.

Further, the Court

may not have understood how the cases support that argument,
because the footnote suggests that the cases were not
authoritative on the question of applicability of park
legislation to state "inholdings" within parks, reciting that "in
both cases the states had ceded jurisdiction to the federal
government." 215 Utah Adv.Rep at 3 0 n.12.
That assertion reflects a misunderstanding of the cited
cases.

United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1977) is

utterly explicit in offering alternative rulings because of some
uncertainty about the state cession of jurisdiction.

Thus Brown

explicitly held that even if the state had not ceded
jurisdiction, the park protection statutes nonetheless protected
the park against activities authorized by the state on state
inholdings.

552 F.2d at 822.

See also Minnesota v. Block, 660

F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981) at 1248-49 (discussing Brown as the
basis for an identical holding without any question of state
cession of jurisdiction).

Similarly, while the state in Free

Enterprise Canoe Renters Ass'n v. Watt had ceded concurrent
jurisdiction over inheld lands to the United States, 711 F.2d
852, at 854 (8th Cir. 1983), the Court specifically addressed the
question of federal authority to exercise regulatory authority

12

over activities on "nonfederal public roads," specifically
upholding National Park Service regulatory authority to "exceed
federal boundaries when necessary" in light of "the recognized
federal power to regulate nonfederal land" pursuant to the Property Clause, U.S. Const, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

711 F.2d at 856.

Thus, contrary to the County's assertion that "it is clear
that this Court understood the considerations posed by NPCA,
County Response at 13, there is reason to believe those
contentions were not fully understood.

Thus, NPCA did not claim

for purposes of this case that the extra-park reach of the cited
federal legislation overrode trust duties.

The legislation and

implementing cases were cited, rather, to demonstrate the
existence of a duty by the Board and Division to take steps
seeking protection consistent with trust duties.

The claim was

that the record showed those agencies had entirely disregarded —
made no effort to fulfill —

that duty, despite the usual legal

duty of administrative agencies to address regally-relevant
factors.

That claim was not addressed by the Court's opinion.
DATED:

November 1, 1993.
Respectfully submitted,
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